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1 The Issue 
‘Happiness Research’ has attracted a great deal of attention in the social sciences as well as in 
the general public. This is reflected by a massive increase in the amount of scholarly work on 
people’s subjective well-being1 and the frequent featuring of happiness research in the media. 
The next logical step would seem to be to construct a National Happiness Indicator (in 
consonance with Gross National Income) for governments to be able to maximize National 
Happiness. The United Kingdom and Australia, as well as certain other countries, are 
committed to producing national measures of well-being and, already back in the 1970s, the 
Kingdom of Bhutan proclaimed that it wanted to maximize Gross National Happiness rather 
than Gross National Income. On the scientific side, a group of fifty well-known scholars is 
promoting the idea of “National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being” (Diener 
2005, Kahneman et al. 2004). It has been argued that “Gross National Happiness” is the 
answer to the paradox that, in cross-sections, happiness is positively correlated with 
individual income, but over time, average happiness is essentially constant, despite a sharp 
                                                
∗ Bruno S. Frey: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, 
Winterthurerstrasse 30, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone: +41 (0)44 634 37 30, fax: +41 (0)44 
634 35 99, email: bsfrey@iew.unizh.ch. 
Alois Stutzer: Center for Economic Science, University of Basel, Petersgraben 51, CH-4003 Basel, 
Switzerland. Phone: +41 (0)61 267 33 61, fax: +41 (0)61 267 33 40, email: alois.stutzer@unibas.ch. 
Both authors are also affiliated with CREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management and 
the Arts. 
1 For surveys on the study of happiness in economics, see Frank (1997), Oswald (1997), Frey and 
Stutzer (2002a,b), van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), Layard (2005), and Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2006). 
   2 
increase in average income levels (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). The use of National 
Happiness Indicators has also been suggested by “libertarian paternalists” (e.g. Sunstein 2007: 
22) to overcome the problem that individuals are not always able to maximize their own 
utility. 
Maximizing social welfare as the ultimate goal of economic policy had already been 
promoted by Bentham (1789) and Edgeworth (1881) and, in modern economics, by exponents 
of quantitative economic policy (Tinbergen 1956 and Theil 1964). However, a major 
drawback to this approach was that the social welfare function could not be empirically 
measured.  
This situation has changed dramatically. Happiness research has designed several indicators 
of subjective well-being, relying on different measurement techniques (for a discussion see 
Kahneman and Krueger 2006): global evaluations of individual life satisfaction, based on 
representative surveys; the Experience Sampling Method, collecting information on 
individuals’ actual experience in real time in their natural environments; the Day 
Reconstruction Method, asking people to reflect on how satisfied they felt at various times 
during the day; the U (“unpleasant”)-Index, defined as the fraction of time per day that an 
individual spends in an unpleasant state; and Brain Imaging, using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan individuals’ brain activities for correlates of positive and 
negative affect.  
Most of the empirical work undertaken so far on happiness research in economics has been 
based on representative, large-scale sampling of individuals’ global evaluations of their life 
satisfaction. The great advantage of this measurement approach is its good performance 
compared to its cost, as well as its availability for a large number of countries and time 
periods. Thus, for example, the surveys on life satisfaction contained in the World Values 
Survey today cover 80 countries, representing over 80 percent of the world’s population over 
4 periods of time. For many tasks, self-reported measures of life satisfaction have proved to 
perform in a satisfactory way, especially for the issues economists are mostly interested in. So 
far, it is the best empirical approximation to the concept of individual welfare used in 
economic theory that is widely available.  
Experience Sampling and Brain Imaging are costly and difficult to apply on a large scale. The 
Day Reconstruction Method and the U-Index are new and, so far, have only been used 
empirically on an experimental basis. The future will tell to what extent, and for which 
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specific issues, happiness researchers will rely on the various measurement approaches. There 
is now wide-spread consensus among scholars that experienced utility and well-being can be 
measured with some degree of accuracy (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1999; Diener 2005; Kahneman 
and Krueger 2006). One indicator that such measurements capture important aspects of well-
being in a credible way is shown by the fact that they correlate with behavior and aspects 
generally associated with happiness. Reliability studies have found that reported subjective 
well-being is moderately stable and sensitive to changing life circumstances (e.g. Ehrhardt et 
al. 2000; Schimmack and Oishi 2005). Consistency tests reveal that happy people smile more 
often during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda 1995), are rated as happy by 
friends and family members (e.g. Sandvik et al. 1993; Lepper 1998) and by spouses (Costa 
and McCrae 1988), express positive emotions more frequently, are more optimistic, are more 
sociable and extravert, and sleep better (Frank 1997, Frey and Stutzer 2002b: 33). Happy 
people are also less likely to commit suicide (Koivumaa Honkanen et al. 2001; Helliwell 
2004). 
The possibility of adequately measuring happiness has led to new visions being formed in 
economics and other social sciences. The most important is certainly the call to use the 
measurements to maximize aggregate happiness as a social welfare function. This paper deals 
with this new vision and inquires whether the maximization of (measured) happiness is a 
worthwhile approach to pursue. Our discussion suggests that it is not; there are major 
objections to this approach. We present an alternative view of how the insights gained from 
happiness research may contribute to policy-making.  
Section 2 outlines how the idea of maximizing social welfare has been taken up in happiness 
research. The following four sections discuss major categories of objections to this approach. 
The first objection is based on classical welfare economics, while the second is based on 
happiness research itself. We then deal with the fundamental objections from political 
economy to happiness maximization. After that, the problem of incentive distortions induced 
by the happiness maximization approach is discussed. In a separate section 7, we address 
concerns by libertarian paternalists. In section 8, finally, we develop an alternative approach 
on how to use the insights of happiness research for policy. We emphasize that we do not 
argue against constructing aggregate happiness indicators as such (they may indeed be useful 
for several purposes), but only against engaging in maximizing them. 
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2 Maximizing Aggregate Happiness 
Focusing on aggregate happiness rather than on Gross National Product (or another measure 
of economic activity) as an indicator of individuals’ welfare has several important advantages. 
As the limitations of the traditional indicators are well documented (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 
2002a, chapter 2), it suffices to make a brief list of them here and compare them with 
measures of happiness. 
1. Measures of happiness include non-material aspects of human well-being, such as the 
influence of social relations, autonomy, and self-determination. These are excluded, or 
inadequately included, in the traditional national accounts and therewith in GNP. Indeed, 
one of the major challenges of happiness research is to explain the “Easterlin Paradox” 
(Easterlin 1974; 1995; 2001), showing that real per capita income has dramatically 
increased in many countries, but happiness has remained constant (see recently, e.g., Di 
Tella and MacCulloch 2005). Aggregate happiness measures go well beyond existing 
extensions of GNP (for a recent survey, see Michalos 2005) such as the “Measure of 
Economic Welfare” (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972), “Economic Aspects of Welfare” (Zolatas 
1981), “Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare” (Daly and Cobb 1989) or “Human 
Development Index” (United Nations Development Programme 2005). These indicators 
exhibit a markedly different development over time than happiness indicators (see, e.g., 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2005).2 
2. Measures of happiness consider outcome aspects of components already included in GNP 
via input measures. This holds, in particular, with respect to the vast area of government 
activity (measured in GNP by the costs of material and labor). It is also directly relevant 
for (public) health and educational expenditures. “Social Indicators” (e.g. the "Index of 
Social Progress" by Estes 1988) mostly measure the input side, such as the number of 
hospital beds and doctors, or the number of class-rooms and teachers. 
3. Measures of happiness look at subjectively evaluated outcomes in line with the basic 
methodological approach of economics. In contrast, the capabilities approach and the 
“Human Development Index” of the United Nations look at objectively observable 
functionings (Sen 1985; 1999; Nussbaum 2000). 
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One might argue that the next logical step would be to take aggregate happiness as a proxy 
measure for social welfare. In fact, maximizing social welfare as the ultimate goal of 
economic policy is an old economics dream, dating back to Bentham (1789) and later to 
Edgeworth (1881), and introduced into contemporary economics by Tinbergen (1956) and 
Theil (1964). This dream is closely linked with the attempt to turn economics into a natural 
science comparable to physics. Consistent with this view, Edgeworth called his book 
“Mathematical Psychics” (1881). The vision of aggregate happiness as a guideline for policy 
is well described by Layard in his influential book on “Happiness” (2005): 
“(…), there are many major choices where rules provide little guidance. There are public choices like 
how to treat criminals, or how to solve traffic problems. Simple appeals to principles of freedom or 
loving-kindness will help little here. (…) The answer can only be found from overarching objectives of 
maximizing human happiness” (p. 124, emphasis added) 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003) implicitly use the same 
theoretical approach. They empirically determine how individuals evaluate macro-economic 
conditions, in particular how they compare unemployment with inflation. Using happiness 
data for twelve European countries and for the time period 1975 to 1991, Di Tella et al. 
(2001) calculate that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is marginally 
compensated for by a 1.7 percentage point decrease in inflation. This result is understood as 
an input on how to set the parameters of a presumed social welfare function in order to choose 
an optimal policy rule. 
The progress made in developing happiness measures also spurs traditional welfare 
economics on in other ways. First, it enables optimal policies to be derived numerically in 
evaluation exercises for government policy. Second, in contrast to postulating a social welfare 
function at the aggregate level based on a wide range of different outcome variables, the well-
being figures provided by happiness research offer an overall evaluation based on individual 
judgments. Moreover, a measure of social welfare based on happiness data is democratic in 
the sense of attributing equal weight to each person. In contrast, the prices relevant for 
assessing the value of goods entering GNP are largely determined by the preferences of 
people with high purchasing power. The preferences of individuals without any income to 
spend are disregarded. 
Despite these developments being advantageous to the idea of social welfare maximization, 
we argue in the following sections that this approach should be rejected for a number of 
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reasons. We certainly do not suggest that GNP should be maximized; rather, we favor a 
different approach in order to use the valuable insights gained from happiness research. 
3 Welfare Economic Objections to Social Welfare Maximization 
Classical welfare economics, which was initially due to, and strongly influenced by, Robbins 
(1932) and Hicks and Allen (1934), has for a long time raised fundamental arguments against 
using the concept of aggregate social welfare in contrast to individual welfare. The two most 
important, and partially interconnected (see Sen 1970) objections to the concept of aggregate 
social welfare are (1) the impossibility of cardinal measurement and interpersonal 
comparisons, and (2) the impossibility theorem. 
Since Arrow (1951), it has been widely accepted that, given a number of “reasonable” 
conditions, no social welfare function exists that generally ranks individual orderings of 
outcomes consistently, except a dictatorship. This impossibility result spawned a huge amount 
of literature (called “Social Choice”), analyzing its robustness to modifications of the 
assumptions. Theorem after theorem demonstrated that almost all changes in the axiomatic 
structure left the dictatorial result unchanged (see e.g. Sen 1970, 1995, Slesnick 1998). The 
conclusion has been drawn that “there is no way we can use empirical observations on their 
own to produce an ethically satisfactory cardinalization, let alone an ethically satisfactory 
social welfare ordering” (Hammond 1991: 220-21). Does this verdict apply to happiness 
functions in their capacity as social welfare functions? The answer depends on whether one 
thinks that the premises of classical welfare economics still hold.  
The ordinalist revolution in economics, on which classical micro-economics is firmly based, 
takes it for granted that individual welfare can only be measured in an ordinal, but not in a 
cardinal way, and that it makes no sense to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. These 
are exactly the fundamental assumptions where the counter-revolution of happiness research 
sets in. If the accumulated evidence (partly mentioned above) is judged sufficient, in the sense 
that it allows for the cardinal measurement and interpersonal comparison of happiness, then 
one or more social welfare functions exist. The most appealing social welfare function is 
probably the unweighted sum of individual cardinal welfare or happiness. 
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We do not take a stand here. We think, however, that both cardinality and interpersonal 
comparability may be less of a problem on a practical level than on a theoretical level.3 For 
many applications, milder assumptions are sufficient. An important example is the valuation 
of public goods and public bads, based on the life satisfaction approach (see, e.g., Frey et al. 
2004). Life satisfaction scores are reported on an ordinal scale. Using adequate statistical 
techniques, like ordered probit or ordered logit, the ordinal information is, however, sufficient 
to calculate a compensating surplus. Moreover, interpersonal comparability at the level of the 
individual is not a necessary condition for valuing public goods in the life satisfaction 
approach. It suffices if individual specific response frames do not systematically vary between 
different groups exposed to different levels of the public good, either across space or over 
time.  
It may be concluded that, while the objections from classical welfare economics must be 
taken seriously, the existing state of research suggests that, for many purposes, happiness or 
reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility. 
4 Objections from Happiness Research to Social Welfare Maximization 
In happiness research, two phenomena are studied that question the maximization of 
aggregate happiness as an objective of public policy. 
The first phenomenon that gives rise to reservations has to do with one of the most central 
findings of happiness research: many changes in life circumstances have only a short-lived 
effect on reported subjective well-being because people adapt to the new situation (Frederick 
and Loewenstein 1999). Extreme and well-known examples are paraplegics who, after a 
period of hardship, report themselves long term to be only a little less happy than before, and 
lottery winners who, after a short period of elation, report themselves to be not much happier 
than before (Brickman et al. 1978). A more recent study, based on longitudinal data, finds that 
average life satisfaction drops when subjected to a moderate disability, but fully recovers to 
the pre-disability level after two years. In the case of a severe disability, however, the 
recovery is incomplete (Oswald and Powdthavee 2006). On the brighter side, the period of 
time leading up to marriage significantly raises average happiness but, over the course of 
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marriage, the happiness level returns  to only a little above the pre-marriage level (Stutzer and 
Frey 2006).  
The second, closely related phenomenon is the change of people’s aspirations due to changes 
in their life circumstances. In the context of economics, the most important finding is that 
people quite rapidly adjust to increases in income: after about one year, two-thirds or more of 
the benefits of an increase in income wear off as people increase their income aspirations 
(Stutzer 2004; van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004). This process has become known as the 
aspiration treadmill and has been used to explain the Easterlin Paradox mentioned above. 
Hedonic adaptation and the aspiration treadmill are not problematic as such for the 
measurement of individual welfare. However, they have considerable consequences for social 
welfare maximization, depending on how they are treated. Imagine if courts have to decide on 
compensation for disabilities sustained in a car accident. For the same physical disabilities, 
should they award lower compensation to people who can more readily adapt and higher 
damages to others who cannot adapt so easily? Or, in the area of government taxation, what 
costs of taxation should be taken into account? Materialists with high income aspirations 
suffer a great deal from personal income tax. Should they be exempt from tax and should 
government services be financed by people who can more readily adapt to whatever their 
material standard of living is? 
In our context, it is important that the way to deal with hedonic adaptation and the aspiration 
treadmill is not part of social welfare maximization, but must be decided at a more 
fundamental level. Thus, one needs a social decision making mechanism to indicate how to 
deal with adaptation and aspiration effects in public policy. Such decisions have serious 
consequences for economic policy, over and above the social welfare maximization approach.  
5 Objections from Political Economics to the Maximization of Aggregate 
Happiness 
The social welfare maximization approach disregards, and tries to substitute for, existing 
political institutions and processes. This is the “benevolent dictator” view castigated in 
Constitutional Political Economy, and does not need to be repeated here.4 The essential 
message is that, in a democracy, there are constitutionally designed rules and institutions 
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allowing citizens to reveal their preferences, and to provide politicians (the government) with 
an incentive to actualize them. As such, the maximization of a social welfare function is an 
intellectual exercise. Even if the government were to pay attention to the results, it has no 
incentive to follow up on them. 
The social welfare maximizing approach, based on empirically estimated happiness functions, 
thus disregards the institutions on which democracy is based. Citizens are reduced to “metric 
stations”. They are forced into a state of passivity, which tends to increase their alienation 
from the State. In this respect, a happiness maximization approach is inimical to democracy. 
It disregards the interaction between citizens and politicians, the interest representation by 
organized groups and the concomitant information and learning processes. 
The latter argument alludes to the fundamental direct interrelation between the approach 
applied to collective choices in a society and individual well-being. People have preferences 
for processes over and above outcomes. They gain well-being from living and acting under 
institutionalized processes, as they contribute to a positive sense of self, addressing innate 
needs of autonomy, relatedness and competence. We call this contribution to individual well-
being ‘procedural utility’. In the economy, individuals have been shown to enjoy procedural 
utility in their capacity as consumers or income earners; in the polity and society, as citizens 
subjected to different political and societal procedures; in organizations, as employees 
confronted with different organizational procedures; and in law, as litigants (for an 
introductory survey, see Frey et al. 2004, and for an application to democracy, see Frey and 
Stutzer 2005). If people are reduced to “metric stations”, they experience a significant loss in 
autonomy when dealing with public affairs and therefore reduced (procedural) well-being.  
Happiness research also fails to provide a rule about the scope and limitations of government 
intervention in the private sphere. Should the government be allowed to prohibit the 
consumption of alcohol if this were to raise the population’s happiness in the long run, or 
should this be left to the discretion of the individuals (based on the results of happiness 
research)? And even more importantly: To what extent should the government be allowed to 
change the preferences of its citizens? Many current interventions might affect people’s well-
being in the future due to a change in preferences. We mention two extreme cases. Imagine 
that the government adopts a policy to make people humble in order to reduce their material 
aspirations initially so that they are more appreciative of material benefits afterwards. Or, 
imagine that the government raises the National Happiness Indicator by inducing people to 
take a “happiness pill”. Should these policies be accepted? This question cannot be answered 
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within the happiness maximization calculus, but must be decided at a more fundamental level. 
A feasible and theoretically consistent approach is to resort to the constitutional level, where 
people make such fundamental decisions behind the veil of uncertainty (see section 7). 
Probably the most fundamental issue is whether happiness is the ultimate goal to be 
maximized. Other valid goals, for instance, may be loyalty, responsibility, self-esteem, 
freedom or personal development. It can well be imagined that a single mother with several 
children does not consider her affective well-being to be of primary importance in her life. 
Rather, responsibility may carry much more weight. Whether happiness is the ultimate goal of 
individuals, or whether it is only one of several goals, constitutes an important and 
controversial issue in philosophy. The maximization of social welfare is not the only, or even 
the most obvious, ultimate goal to be pursued by public policy. 
6 Induced Incentive Distortions 
So far, we have assumed that the decision to maximize social welfare in terms of aggregate 
(measured) happiness does not have any influence on the measurement of subjective well-
being. This assumption is highly debatable. Indeed, the political use of aggregate happiness 
will certainly induce strategic interactions between government and individuals. Two kinds of 
distortions need to be taken into account. 
Once aggregate happiness has become politically relevant, the government, public 
bureaucracy and various interest groups have an incentive to manipulate it. This has proved to 
be true for GNP and for other economic indicators declared to be goals of government 
activity. As the unemployment rate has become a politically important indicator, governments 
have started to influence it in order to paint a better picture of the state of the labor market 
than is the actual case. Thus, for instance, people who have been unemployed for a long time 
are defined as no longer belonging to the workforce, and therefore no longer raising the 
official unemployment rate. It is also well known that the way of measuring budget deficits 
has been cleverly manipulated by some European countries when the rules for entering the 
European Monetary Union required that budget deficits did not exceed three percent of GDP 
and that the public debt did not exceed sixty percent of GDP. Many EU member countries 
(most notably Greece and Italy) resorted to accounting tricks or “creative accounting”5 in 
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order to meet these requirements, though in reality they clearly violated them (see, e.g., Forte 
2001; von Hagen and Wolff 2004). Such distortions of indicators were so widespread that 
observers stated that “[...] the determining factor for achieving membership of the planned 
European Monetary Union (EMU) seems to rely on widespread use of public-sector creative 
accounting measures” (Dafflon and Rossi 1999: 59-60). In the (rare) case in which a 
government is unable to manipulate a particular indicator to its benefit, it has an incentive to 
create new indicators. This is easily possible in the case of happiness. As has been pointed out 
in the second section, a variety of indicators may capture individual well-being. Governments 
and pressure groups will choose those most beneficial to their respective interests, or will 
even create new ones better suited to their purposes.  
The second systematic distortion stems from the incentive of respondents to misrepresent 
their well-being. When individuals become aware that the happiness level they report 
influences the behavior of political actors, they have an incentive to misrepresent it. They can 
“play the system”.  
The two systematic distortions discussed represent a basic phenomenon, which even applies 
to the natural sciences. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that the observation of a 
system fundamentally disturbs it. In the social sciences, both the observation and public 
reporting can change the observed behavior of the people involved. This reaction is related to 
Goodhart’s Law and the Lucas Critique (see Chrystal and Mizen 2003). Goodhart’s Law 
(1975) states that any observed statistical relationship – such as the happiness function – will 
tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. The Lucas Critique 
(1976) refers more specifically to econometric modeling: a different policy making behavior 
(such as using an aggregate happiness indicator) influences the expectations of private agents 
and this changes behavior in a rational-expectations model.  
7 Concerns by Libertarian Paternalists 
Much evidence has been collected showing that individuals are not always able to maximize 
their own utility (e.g. Thaler 1988, 1992, Kahneman and Thaler 2006), and that therefore, 
aggregate utitity will not be maximized either. These systematic mistakes refer to such 
instances as myopia, excessive optimism, the focusing illusion, utility misprediction in 
general, as well as a weakness of will (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole 2004). Thus Sunstein (2007: 
                                                                                                                                                   
in order to make financial statements which look different from what is intended by the rule (Jameson 
1988). 
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3) argues that “[…] people are often willing to pay a great deal for goods whose acquisition 
does not improve their welfare”. Recently, the libertarian (or new) paternalists (e.g. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003, Thaler and Sunstein 2003) have come up with interesting 
proposals to make people more satisfied in situations where no coercion is involved. They 
treat ”internalities”, i.e. decisions in which people do not take into account that their choices 
impose costs on their future selves, analogous to “externalities” in classical Pigovian welfare 
analysis. The government is called upon to correct for these bargaining failures occurring 
between the current and future self (Schelling 1978, Thaler and Shefrin 1981, Ainslie 1992). 
Examples are sin taxes on smoking, obesity or gambling, imposing market restrictions and 
mandatory saving plans (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003). The libertarian paternalists are 
fully aware of a possible government failure but take it to be smaller in these areas than the 
consequences of the individual mistakes. The approach is, however, ill at ease with a Coasian 
(1960) view in which the two selves – in the case of self-control problems - are seen 
interacting with each other and seeking a solution minimizing harm (Whitman 2006). Many 
possibilities exist, such as promising a trade-off (such as for a person suffering of a weakness 
of will with respect to TV: “I watch this film this evening but I will take my children to a 
basketball play on Sunday”). The solution can also include doing nothing, and in the case of 
misers, workaholics or anorectics deciding in favor of the current self. The government would 
undertake corresponding actions only if it were fully informed and would solely pursue the 
welfare of the persons concerned.  
Our approach specified in the next section suggests a related alternative avenue. Institutions 
have to be considered helping individuals to overcome as best as possible the harm produced 
by systematically mistaken decisions. 
8 An Alternative Vision of How to Use Happiness Research for Policy   
Our discussion has endeavored to show that the maximization of aggregate happiness as a 
social welfare function is a doubtful approach for several reasons: 
- Governments are not composed of purely benevolent politicians wanting to make the 
population as happy as possible. Rather, the personal interests of politicians also matter; 
- The essential elements of democratic governance are disregarded: democracy consists of 
interaction between politicians and citizens on many different levels, structured by the 
constitution and not simply recording the reported well-being of the citizens; 
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- The government has an incentive to manipulate the happiness indicators and to create new 
ones to suit their goals; 
- The individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their happiness levels strategically in 
order to influence government policy in their favor. 
Some might also argue that problems of cardinality and interpersonal comparability can never 
be fully overcome. 
Of course, these arguments do not mean that the maximization of GNP would be preferable to 
maximizing aggregate happiness (however that is conceived). We argue that happiness 
research should not aim at constructing a social welfare function at all, but that the insights 
provided by happiness research should be used in a different way. 
Our vision rests on the fundamental presumption that the quality of the political process is a 
key factor to people’s happiness and that the legitimacy of political action finally rests on the 
voluntary agreement of the citizens involved. Individual sovereignty should not be reduced to 
self-reports on one’s well-being. It should include choices on how to best pursue happiness, 
both individually and collectively. The claim is not for ‘naïve’ consumer or citizen 
sovereignty in the sense that behavior is always optimal. People, with their bounded 
rationality and bounded willpower, are sometimes aware of their own limitations (and 
sometimes only of those of their fellow citizens). 
Accordingly, at the collective level, the political process should be institutionally structured 
so that people’s common interests become the principal driving force. Economic policy must 
help to establish those fundamental institutions, which make politicians and pubic bureaucrats 
most responsive to people’s common interests and which finally lead to the best possible 
fulfillment of individual preferences. As argued above, happiness is not necessarily people’s 
ultimate goal; other important goals may be loyalty, responsibility, self-esteem, personal 
development, justice, religiosity, or freedom. It may even be that people see some virtue in 
unhappiness if they reckon that discontent is the only way to overcome social ills.  
For single individuals, the institutions chosen at the constitutional level serve to help 
individuals to minimize the harm produced by systematically wrong decisions. In contrast to 
libertarian paternalism the focus is not on the direct intervention by government via corrective 
taxes or other means. Rather, the institutions selected give individuals the insights and means 
to best solve the bargaining situation between the current and future selves or to best deal with 
the interaction between affective and deliberative processes affecting people’s behavior. 
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Serving this goal is the educational system a more open access to information and enabling 
free discussion (Frey and Stutzer 2006). This can well mean that individuals adopt the 
suggestions by libertarian paternalists and agree, e.g., to have collective self-binding 
mechanisms like a mandatory pension system. Under these circumstances individuals are 
better able to minimize harm, and to pursue their individual happiness.  
Research in constitutional economics helps us to identify which institutions serve this goal. 
Happiness research provides insights on how, and to what extent, institutions have systematic 
effects on indicators of individual well-being. The emphasis is on institutions rather than 
specific policy interventions. To give an example, happiness policy should focus on the 
relationship between the fiscal constitution of a jurisdiction and people’s subjective well-
being rather than on the optimal tax scheme in terms of happiness. The range of institutions 
under study includes self-binding mechanisms, social norms, private and public law (i.e. the 
rules of the game) as well as constitutional conditions on how to choose rules. 
The results gained from happiness research should be taken as inputs into the political 
process.6 These inputs have to prove themselves in political competition and in the discourse 
among citizens, and between citizens and politicians. This vision differs fundamentally from 
an approach emphasizing the maximization of a social welfare function. 
The arguments raised should not be understood as arguing against better measures of 
happiness. Broadly speaking, measuring citizens’ happiness should not focus on generating an 
ever better single aggregate indicator, but rather on improving possibly many different 
indicators and bringing new insights into the various aspects of individual well-being.  
Happiness research has already produced many insights, which can be introduced into the 
political discussion process. They include policy issues like, for example, the role of direct 
democratic decision making on citizens’ well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2000), the effect of 
mandatory retirement and mandatory schooling on happiness (Charles 2002; Oreopoulos 
2005), the consequences of social work norms and birth control rights on women’s well-being 
(Lalive and Stutzer 2004; Pezzini 2005), the impact of tobacco taxes on smokers’ well-being 
(Gruber and Mullainathan 2005) or the relation between working time regulations and 
                                                
6 As well, of course, as making more informed decisions on their individual lives such as taking 
recourse to appropriate self-binding mechanisms in order to overcome problems of utility 
misprediction identified by happiness research. 
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people’s subjective well-being (Alesina et al. 2005). A competent overview of selected 
findings, with policy relevance, is provided by Diener and Seligman (2004).  
9 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of our paper was to outline two possible viewpoints on the role of happiness 
research in public policy. A discussion is warranted as the viewpoint is important in the 
choice of research questions and thus the kind of knowledge happiness research aims at 
providing, as well as for the people it aims at addressing.  
The huge progress in the measurement of individual welfare makes it tempting to pursue the 
old dream of maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function. Improvements in 
individual well-being are claimed to be measured directly and politics is seen as following 
advice and implementing it with suitable interventions in the political process.  
However, we postulate that the appropriate approach is not to maximize aggregate happiness 
directly in seeking to improve outcomes by direct interventions. Rather, we see the role of 
happiness research as seeking to improve the nature of the political processes. Individuals 
should become better able of advancing what constitutes their idea of the good life, both 
individually and collectively. They should be made aware that different issues require 
different measures and indicators of well-being. Happiness research should remain open to 
constructing a number of different indicators, reflecting well-being according to different 
aspects of life. Plurality is a necessary consequence of the procedural view outlined. This is in 
stark contrast to the maximization approach requiring one single objective. 
All this does not mean that it would be useless to construct a National Happiness Indicator. It 
has an important role to fulfill as an important macroeconomic input in the political discourse. 
It helps us in overcoming the currently dominant orientation towards the Gross National 
Product centered on material concerns. Politicians are forced to justify their actions in terms 
of a broader and better indicator of individual welfare. It is also useful in strengthening the 
yardstick competition between political units and political parties. “National” Happiness 
Indicators should therefore be disaggregated to regional, county, and communal levels. The 
useful role of having one happiness indicator (or, better still, several happiness indicators)is 
independent of maximizing the National Happiness Indicator. 
 
   16 
References 
Ainslie, George (1992). Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational 
States within the Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (2005). Work and Leisure in the 
United States and Europe: Why So Different? In: Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff 
(eds). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 1-64. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Bénabou, Roland J. and Jean Tirole (2004). Willpower and Personal Rules. Journal of 
Political Economy 112(4): 848-887. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Blanchflower, David G. and Andrew J. Oswald (2005). Happiness and the Human 
Development Index: The Paradox of Australia. Australian Economic Review 38(3): 
307-318. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan (1986). The Reason of Rules: Constitutional 
Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Brickman, Philip, Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff Bulman (1978). Lottery Winners and 
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 36(8): 917-927. 
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Charles, Kerwin Kofi (2002). Is Retirement Depressing? Labor Force Inactivity and 
Psychological Well-Being in Later Life. NBER Working Paper No. 9033, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Chrystal, K. Alec and Paul D. Mizen (2003). Goodhart's Law: Its Origins, Meaning and 
Implications for Monetary Policy. In: Paul D. Mizen (ed.). Central Banking, Monetary 
Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, vol. 1. Cheltenham, 
U.K. and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar: 221-243. 
Coase, Ronald H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3(1): 
31-44. 
Costa, Paul T. and Robert R. McCrae (1988). Personality in Adulthood: A Six-Year 
Longitudinal Study of Self-Reports and Spouse Ratings on the Neo Personality 
Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(5): 853-863. 
Dafflon, Bernard and Sergio Rossi (1999). Public Accounting Fudges Towards Emu: A First 
Empirical Survey and Some Public Choice Considerations. Public Choice 101(1-2): 
59-84. 
Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb (1989). For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. London: Green Print. 
Di Tella, Rafael and Robert MacCulloch (2005). Gross National Happiness as an Answer to 
the Easterlin Paradox? Mimeo, Harvard Business School. 
Di Tella, Rafael and Robert MacCulloch (2006). Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 25-46. 
Di Tella, Rafael, Robert J. MacCulloch and Andrew J. Oswald (2001). Preferences over 
Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness. American 
Economic Review 91(1): 335-341. 
Di Tella, Rafael, Robert J. MacCulloch and Andrew J. Oswald (2004).The Macroeconomics 
of Happiness. Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 809-827. 
Diener, Ed (2005). Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being. 
Mimeo, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. 
   17 
Diener, Ed and Martin E.P. Seligman (2004). Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-
Being. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5(1): 1-31. 
Easterlin, Richard A. (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some 
Empirical Evidence. In: Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder (eds). Nations and 
Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honour of Moses Abramowitz. New York 
and London: Academic Press: 89-125. 
Easterlin, Richard A. (1995). Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All? 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27(1): 35-48. 
Easterlin, Richard A. (2001). Income and Happiness: Towards an Unified Theory. Economic 
Journal 111(473): 465-484. 
Edgeworth, Francis Y. (1881). Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of 
Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London, UK: Kegan Paul. 
Ehrhardt, Joop J., Willem E. Saris and Ruut Veenhoven (2000). Stability of Life-Satisfaction 
over Time: Analysis of Change in Ranks in a National Population. Journal of 
Happiness Studies 1(2): 177-205. 
Estes, Richard (1988). Trends in World Social Development: The Social Progress of Nations, 
1970-1987. New York: Praeger. 
Fernández-Dols, José-Miguel and María-Angeles Ruiz-Belda (1995). Are Smiles a Sign of 
Happiness? Gold Medal Winners at the Olympic Games. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 69(6): 1113-1119. 
Forte, Francesco (2001). The Maastricht “Excessive Deficit” Rules and Creative Accounting. 
In: Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio (eds). Rules and Reason. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Frank, Robert H. (1997). The Frame of Reference as a Public Good. Economic Journal 107 
(445): 1832-47. 
Frederick, Shane and George Loewenstein (1999). Hedonic Adaptation. In: Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz (eds). Well-Being: The Foundation of 
Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: 302-329. 
Frey, Bruno S. (1983). Democratic Economic Policy: A Theoretical Introduction. Oxford: 
Robertson. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2000). Happiness, Economy and Institutions. Economic 
Journal 110(466): 918-938. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002a). Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and 
Institutions Affect Well-Being. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002b). What Can Economists Learn from Happiness 
Research? Journal of Economic Literature 40(2): 402-35. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2005). Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility. 
Oxford Economic Papers 57(1): 90-111. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2006). Mispredicting Utility and the Political Process. In: 
Edward J. McCaffery and Joel Slemrod (eds). Behavioral Public Finance. Russell 
Sage Foundation: 113-140. 
Frey, Bruno S., Matthias Benz and Alois Stutzer (2004). Introducing Procedural Utility: Not 
Only What, But Also How Matters. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 160(3): 377-401. 
Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer (2004). Valuing Public Goods: The Life 
Satisfaction Approach. IEW Working Paper No. 184, University of Zurich. 
Goodhart, Charles A. E. (1975). Money, Information and Uncertainty. London: Macmillan. 
Gruber, Jonathan H. and Sendhil Mullainathan (2005). Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers 
Happier? Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 5(1): 1-43. 
   18 
Hammond, Peter J. (1991). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are 
and Should Be Made. In: J. Elster and J. E. Roemer (eds.). Interpersonal Comparisons 
of Well-Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 200-254. 
Helliwell, John F. (2004). Well-Being and Social Capital: Does Suicide Pose a Puzzle? NBER 
Working Paper No. 10896, Cambridge, MA. 
Hicks, John R. and Roy G. D. Allen (1934). A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value, I. 
Economica 1: 52-75.  
Jameson, Michael (1988). Practical Guide to Creative Accounting. London: Kogan Page. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Alan B. Krueger (2006). Developments in the Measurement of 
Subjective Well-Being. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 3-24. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz and Arthur A. 
Stone (2004). Toward National Well-Being Accounts. American Economic Review 
94(2): 429-34. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz (eds) (1999). Well-Being: The 
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Richard H. Thaler (2006). Anomalies: Utility Maximization and 
Experienced Utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 221-234. 
Koivumaa Honkanen, Heli, Risto Honkanen, Heimo Viinamaki, Kauko Heikkila, Jaakko 
Kaprio and Markku Koskenvuo (2001). Life Satisfaction and Suicide: A 20-Year 
Follow-up Study. American Journal of Psychiatry 158(3): 433-439. 
Lalive, Rafael and Alois Stutzer (2004). Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in 
Well-Being. IEW Working Paper No. 194, University of Zurich. 
Layard, Richard (2005). Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. New York: Penguin. 
Leigh, Andrew and Justin Wolfers (2006). Happiness and the Human Development Index: 
Australia Is Not a Paradox. Australian Economic Review 39(2): 176-184. 
Lepper, Heidi S. (1998). Use of Other-Reports to Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures. 
Social Indicators Research 44(3): 367-379. 
Lucas, Robert E. (1976). Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. In: Karl Brunner and 
Allan H. Meltzer (eds.). The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 1. New York: North-Holland: 19-46. 
Michalos, Alex C. (ed.) (2005). Citation Classics from Social Indicators Research. The Most 
Cited Articles. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Mueller, Dennis C. (1996). Constitutional Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nordhaus, William and James Tobin (1972). Is Growth Obsolete? NBER General Series No. 
96. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (2003). Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a 
Model of Sin Taxes. American Economic Review 93(2): 186-191. 
Oreopoulos, Philip (2005). Do Dropouts Drop out Too Soon?  Wealth, Health, and Happiness 
from Compulsory Schooling. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of 
Toronto. 
Oswald, Andrew J. (1997). Happiness and Economic Performance. Economic Journal 107 
(445): 1815-31. 
Oswald, Andrew J. and Nattavudh Powdthavee (2006). Does Happiness Adapt? A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges. 
Discussion Paper No. 2208, IZA, Bonn. 
   19 
Pezzini, Silvia (2005). The Effect of Women's Rights on Women's Welfare: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment. Economic Journal 115(502): C208-C227. 
Robbins, Lionel C. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. 
London: Macmillan. Selections reprinted in Daniel M. Hausman (ed.). (1984) The 
Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sandvik, Ed, Ed Diener and Larry Seidlitz (1993). Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence 
and Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures. Journal of Personality 
61(3): 317-342. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1978). Egonomics or the Art of Self-Management. American 
Economic Review 68(2): 290-294.  
Schimmack, Ulrich and Shigehiro Oishi (2005). The Influence of Chronically and 
Temporarily Accessible Information on Life Satisfaction Judgments. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 89(3): 395-406. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1995). Rationality and Social Choice. American Economic Review 85(1): 
1-24. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf. 
Slesnick, Daniel T. (1998). Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare. Journal of 
Economic Literature 36(4): 2108-2165.  
Stutzer, Alois (2004). The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 54(1): 89-109. 
Stutzer, Alois and Bruno S. Frey (2006). Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do Happy 
People Get Married? Journal of Socio-Economics 35(2): 326-347. 
Sunstein, Cass R. (2007). Willingness to Pay Versus Welfare. Mimeo, University of Chicago. 
Thaler, Richard H. (1988). Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 2(4): 195-206. 
Thaler, Richard H. (1992). The Winner’s Curse. Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life. 
New York: Free Press. 
Thaler, Richard H. and H. M. Shefrin (1981). An Economic Theory of Self-Control. Journal 
of Political Economy 89(2): 392-406. 
Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein (2003). Libertarian Paternalism. American Economic 
Review 93(2): 175-179. 
Theil, Henri (1964). Optimal Decision Rules for Government and Industry. Amsterdam: 
North Holland. 
Tinbergen, Jan (1956). Economic Policy: Principles and Design. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
van Praag, Bernard M.S. and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004). Happiness Quantified - a 
Satisfaction Calculus Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vanberg, Viktor J. (2005). Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political 
Economy. Journal of Institutional Economics 1(1): 23-49. 
von Hagen, Jürgen and Guntram B. Wolff (2004). What Do Deficits Tell Us About Debts?: 
Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting with Fiscal Rules in the EU. Series 1: 
Studies of the Economic Research Centre. Discussion Paper No. 38, Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
Whitman, Glen (2006). Against the New Paternalism. Internalities and the Economics of Self-
Control. Policy Analysis 563: 1-16. 
Zolatas, Xenophon (1981). Economic Growth and Declining Social Welfare. Athens: Bank of 
Greece. 
 
